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Now it’s the turn of EU leaders to do ‘whatever it takes’ to
save Europe – or it won’t be enough
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/23/now-its-the-turn-of-eu-leaders-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-
europe-or-it-wont-be-enough/
The European Council will hold a video conference on the Covid-19 outbreak
later today. Sebastian Diessner, Erik Jones and Corrado Macchiarelli
write that with European economies under unprecedented strain, it is now
time for EU leaders to commit to doing whatever it takes to forestall the crisis.
Everyone is waiting for the ‘whatever it takes’ moment that is going to
ward off Europe’s impending fiscal and financial crisis. At the same time,
European heads of state or government are determined that whatever it
takes should happen within limits. The time has come for them to realise
that they cannot have it both ways. Either they are going to accept the
responsibility for doing whatever it takes to forestall the crisis, or they are
going to have to admit that other actors – most notably the European
Central Bank – will have to set aside their remaining limits. Moreover, it
has always been this way. The difference now is that whatever buffers
might have made it possible in the past to tolerate the contradictions
between ‘whatever it takes’ and ‘within limits’ have been exhausted.
Consider Mario Draghi’s famous commitment to preserve the euro, a bold
pledge to purchase sovereign bonds in virtually unlimited quantities in
order to stave off the fragmentation of the euro area. The pledge itself
arguably saved the common currency back in 2012. However, it was never truly
unlimited. The guardians of European monetary orthodoxy fought tooth and nail to
prove that the ECB’s actions were breaching the limits of its mandate. But even if that
were not the case, it remained unclear how much sovereign debt with a residual
maturity of less than three years the ECB could actually have bought from a country like
Italy. It was also unclear what kind of conditionality Italy would have had to accept to
qualify for assistance in the first place. What is clear then is that there are limits – in
terms of maturity, exposure levels, volumes, and qualifications – which would have to be
breached for the policy to be activated.
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German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, with French President, Emmanuel Macron, at a
meeting in February 2020, Credit: European Union
The same is true for the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme today, despite
President Lagarde’s proclamation that there are ‘no limits’ to the central bank’s resolve to
see the euro area through this crisis, a pledge that proved controversial even within the
ECB’s own decision-making body. While the ECB said the usual 33 per cent country-
ceiling would not apply to its emergency programme, the Governing Council established
that the programme would run until the end of this calendar year and entail up to €750
billion in new acquisitions. Given the burn rate over the past four weeks, however, it is
doubtful that the sum will last that long.
Since the programme started, on 26 March, the ECB has already settled €70.7 billion –
and that only covers purchases that have been settled, meaning purchases initiated after
17 April are not covered yet. Assuming the same pace will continue, the programme may
just make it to the end of the year — so less than nine months). Given what happened in
government bond markets last week, however, one can only imagine that the pace has
increased. Of course, the Governing Council already signalled that it can add more to the
volume and the calendar. That will require another decision and presumably a fresh set
of limits. Just like the current ones, these will likely be tested by the markets sooner
rather than later.
An area where the ECB appears to acknowledge that limits can hardly be imposed is the
reinvestment of the principal of those assets from previous purchase programmes that
mature on its balance sheet. For months now, the official policy has been that this
reinvestment will take place so long as necessary to restore expectations of inflation to a
level that is consistent with the ECB’s definition of price stability. That essentially
amounts to an unlimited commitment to an expanded ECB balance sheet, somewhat
akin to monetary finance. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, we have seen tensions here in the
past and we should expect to see tensions again in the future.
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If the German government returns to a policy of fiscal consolidation soon after the crisis
while other countries maintain a much higher level of indebtedness, for example, it will
be very hard for the ECB to maintain an extended balance sheet without running afoul of
its own standard for proportionality, the so-called capital key. Eventually, then, the ECB’s
Governing Council will have to choose to ignore its own limits in order to achieve its core
mandate. A good reason for Europe’s heads of state or government to think creatively is
so that the ECB can continue to colour within the lines. Otherwise, Europe’s heads of
state or government can expect the central bank to be forced to cast aside even the most
sacrosanct of its limits, including the prohibition of monetary finance.
But the European Council has its own contradictions between commitments and limits
to reconcile. The North wants to offer solidarity without redistribution; the South
demands redistribution without obligation. It is no more useful trying to identify which
side of the conflict is morally superior than it is to recognise which group of political
leaders is in the more impossible position with respect to their own domestic politics.
The point is simply that these limits are inconsistent with the commitment to the future
of the European project.
Unlike the ECB’s Governing Council, however, the European Council is a political
authority that is empowered to exercise discretion over how Europe is organised. It now
faces a choice between the Europe that the founders imagined and constituted, and the
limits written into and implied in that constitutional arrangement. This is a foundational
moment. The EU’s leaders can either unbind Europe or risk its demise. Whatever it takes
must not be limited this time, or – paraphrasing Draghi’s famous speech – it is unlikely to
be enough.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: A version of this article appears at Encompass Europe. The article gives the views of
the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School
of Economics.
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